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ABSTRACT
The case for policies to be based on evidence appeared 
to gain a major boost with the publication of the 
Brussels Declaration, apparently with support from many 
leading scientists and institutions. Yet, as we show in 
this analysis, there are major concerns about how it was 
developed and, in particular, the extensive involvement 
of tobacco and alcohol industry actors. We describe how 
its coverage of conlicts of interest and vested interests 
is consistent with the perspectives of these same actors. 
The process of developing the Declaration successfully 
involved science advisors, other senior oficials in 
governments and politicians in its preparation. Despite 
this, the inal Declaration fails to address the need for 
safeguards to protect the integrity of science or policy 
from corporate interests, including in relation to the 
tobacco industry. This undermines Article 5.3 of the 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control which seeks 
to protect public health policies from interference by the 
tobacco companies. More broadly, the Declaration offers 
potential to serve as a vehicle for advancing the vested 
interests of corporate sectors in public policymaking and 
appears to have been regarded in this way by a range 
of organisations related to the alcohol industry. This 
exercise is now being extended to the continent of Africa, 
which is strategically important to both the tobacco and 
alcohol industries. It will be important to study carefully 
to what extent initiatives like this form part of the global 
political strategies of tobacco and alcohol industry actors.
INTRODUCTION
The Brussels Declaration is a statement of ethics and 
principles for science and society policymaking.1 
This arose from discussions at the prestigious 
World Science Forum, and was designed to attract 
attention. It was launched formally at the Amer-
ican Association for the Advancement of Science in 
February 2017, accompanied by an announcement 
in the journal Nature.2 It raises questions about 
the integrity of scientists and calls on them to be 
less aloof and perhaps less arrogant.1 It calls on 
policymakers to be more accountable and, crucially, 
demands that voices of interest groups are heard in 
the policy debate. At a time when facts are increas-
ingly being questioned in some political fora, it has 
the potential to be very influential.
Its avowed goal, evidence-based policymaking, 
will be widely shared (see box 1 for summary text). 
Yet while it makes much of the need for research 
integrity and transparency, the Declaration fails to 
disclose its own origins and funding, or the interests 
of those involved. Moreover, on closer inspection 
there are many curious aspects to the organisation 
of what purports to be a bottom up initiative.1 
This analysis examines the background to the initia-
tive and process of developing it, before drawing 
attention to concerns about the detailed content 
and prospects for influence, and finally addressing 
some of the issues raised.
A PROCESS THAT PERMITS TOBACCO COMPANY 
INVOLVEMENT
The initiative is reported to have originated with 
a communications consultancy called Sci-Com 
(http://www. sci- com. eu/ main/ index. php/ about- 
us/ who- we- are) which is dedicated to delivering 
solutions to communicating the most challenging 
science. From the outset, published documentation 
on the Sci-Com website has given prominence to 
harm reduction and addiction to tobacco, alcohol 
and drugs.3 We can find no declarations of interest 
in any of its publications or reports.
The Declaration states that it was developed 
following a series of consultations with more 
than 300 stakeholders from 2012 onwards.2 One 
hundred and sixty-five are named in the report, 62 
of whom, including the organisers, were present 
at the concluding event in 2016, and another 
103 who attended earlier consultation events or 
contributed text.1 There is little information avail-
able on how participants were selected, or who was 
involved, apart from those named. The Declaration 
lists those participating, including distinguished 
public health scientists, science journalists, senior 
science advisors and other officials in govern-
ments, current and former members of parliaments 
and government ministers, and representatives of 
industry. This is not surprising; there are many 
fora where these groups come together to discuss 
science policy.
What is surprising, however, is the substan-
tial presence of representatives from the tobacco 
industry and, especially, British American Tobacco 
(BAT). Indeed, with participation by its Group 
Scientific Director, Chief Scientific Officer, Head 
of Biosciences at Group R & D, International 
Scientific Affairs Manager, as well as the Chief 
Medical Officer, Head of R & D and Interna-
tional Public and Scientific Affairs Director of its 
wholly owned Nicoventures,1 BATs representa-
tion exceeds that of any other company. There are 
also two representatives each from the American 
Chamber of Commerce to the European Union 
and the European Smokeless Tobacco Council 
(BAT is a member of both, as are other tobacco 
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companies), and from Swedish Match1 (which is also a member 
of the latter).
This was very different from the first meeting in 2012, from 
which the tobacco industry was excluded as a condition for 
the participation of the European Commissions health direc-
torate, DG Sanco.3 This was in compliance with Article 5.3 of 
the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC)4 which 
precludes the tobacco industry and related vested interests from 
having any input into public health policy. We see no indica-
tions that the various named individuals linked to the European 
Commission were involved after the first meeting.
It is unclear why the situation changed subsequently, with 
BAT personnel becoming prominently involved, for example, 
through multiple authorships among 20 thought leader essays.1 
The content of the Declaration expects rather a lot of scientists 
and policymakers, and rather less of industry actors; it questions 
the integrity of scientists, calls on them to be less aloof  and 
demands accountability for their use of public funding. It also 
calls on policymakers to be more accountable. It proposes that 
they give much greater access to industry, the organisations that 
represent its interests and the public, which although unsaid 
is likely to include many grassroots organisations created by 
industry, sometimes described as astroturf ,5 as well as those 
who advocate on their behalf on social media, whether real 
people or bots.6
In this context, it is worth considering further the we whose 
voices make this declaration. 
Richard Horton, the editor of the Lancet, who attended the 
first event and was unaware of any subsequent process involving 
tobacco companies, was quoted, as if as offering an endorse-
ment, despite not having seen, or been aware of, the Declara-
tion.7 This calls into question the process described to produce 
this statement of principles and recommendations, particularly 
as it declares that: All too often, who those experts are, how 
they are chosen and how reliable their advice really is, is open to 
question.1 We asked the founder and chief executive officer of 
Sci-Com by email whether they were; willing to share details of 
all those who funded the work that led to the Declaration, and 
also advise whether you have any policy on taking funding from 
the tobacco industry. We received no reply. In these circum-
stances, a careful analysis of the wording of the Declaration 
seems justified.
DETAILED CONTENT ANALYSIS
The Declaration advocates an alternative to a continued 
dangerous slide into the realm of policy-biased evidence,1 
though what this alternative is or might be is unclear. The 
content is broad in scope, covering a wide range of issues at 
the science/policy interface. For example, there is much content 
on science advice, science policy and public health, and impor-
tantly in relation to prospects for future influence, the initia-
tive secured the involvement of high-level scientific advisors to 
public institutions, as well as other senior officials.
The view that vested interests can be beneficial,1 as long 
as they are declared has long been advocated by the tobacco 
industry, notwithstanding evidence of studies being designed 
to give the intended results, including the creation of doubt,8 
and by meta-analyses showing that the funding source can be 
an important factor in the results obtained.912 Scientists are 
encouraged not to discount citizen science, despite extensive 
evidence of how corporations have supported social media 
campaigns to challenge accepted scientific wisdom13 and 
used front groups to shift the discourse and attack legitimate 
researchers.14 The tobacco industrys long history of distorting 
scientific evidence means that many leading medical journals 
will not consider for publication any material resulting from 
tobacco industry funding.15 16 The challenging issues inevitably 
raised by any tobacco company involvement in any consid-
eration of the relationships between science and policy are 
entirely ignored.
Box 1 Brussels Declaration summary text1
Science and policy—a crucial relationship
1. Science is a fundamental pillar of knowledge-based 
societies.
2. Science can help provide the evidence base for public policy.
3. Sound public policy is crucial for the direction and priorities 
of science.
4. The dialogue between science and policy is never 
straightforward.
What we expect from the scientific community
5. The integrity of science needs to be clear and the integrity of 
scientists providing advice must be unimpeachable.
6. The full range of scientiic disciplines should be included; 
notably, the social sciences can play a key role in improving 
how the public may react or adapt.
7. Scientists must learn to use established communication 
channels for providing policy advice more effectively and be 
less aloof and perhaps less arrogant.
8. Scientists must listen and respond to criticism.
What we expect from the policymaking community
9. Policymakers must listen, consult and be held accountable.
10. Ethical consideration of the impact of policy decisions is 
crucial
11. Policymakers have to challenge science to deliver on public 
investment.
12. Policymakers should be willing to justify decisions, 
particularly where they deviate from independent scientiic 
advice.
13. Policy makers should acknowledge the potential for bias and 
vested interests contrary to the scientiic consensus 
What we expect from the public, media, industry and 
interest groups
14. The public plays a critical role in inluencing policy and must 
be included in the decision-making process.
15. Industry is an investor in knowledge generation and science 
and has every right to have its voice heard.
16. Interest groups similarly have every right to have their 
voice heard as guardians of the common good or legitimate 
sectoral interests.
17. Advice from any source to policymaking must acknowledge 
possible bias.
What needs to change: how scientific advice and greater 
inclusivity need to be integrated more effectively
18. Scientiic advice must be more involved in all stages of the 
policymaking process.
19. Policymaking must learn to cope with the speed of scientiic 
development and include greater foresight and policy 
anticipation.
20. Societal investment in science will always require 
priority setting; nevertheless, advances in public health 
deserve special attention.
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The Declaration champions views promulgated by organisa-
tions such as the Institute of Economic Affairs,17 an organisa-
tion endorsed by some British politicians,18 which is among the 
lowest scoring on an index of funding transparency19 but which 
is known to have received tobacco industry funding. It has a 
long history of opposing health organisations and measures they 
propose to reduce the harms of tobacco and alcohol.17 It regards 
public funding of science as a source of bias in policymaking,20 as 
part of its long-standing hostility to public institutions, deploying 
this argument to attack what is described in the Declaration as 
the scientific-political establishment.1 It seems unconcerned by 
any risk of bias from funding of research by those with vested 
commercial interests.
The scale on which tobacco companies are still seeking to 
undermine tobacco control measures has been recently docu-
mented by the WHO,21 and confirmed yet again by media 
exposés such as the acquisition, by Reuters, of a large repository 
of industry documents22 and a series of reports in the Guardian 
newspaper.23 The policies fiercely opposed by tobacco compa-
nies are crucial for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals 
and other global targets to reduce non-communicable diseases.24 
Yet the Declaration fails to mention the FCTC or Article 5.3.4 
On the contrary, although not identifying the tobacco industry as 
such, it states that: Industry is not to be shunned when it comes 
to policy-making1 and industry should speak out more when 
denied access to important policy-making.1
By promoting industry involvement in policymaking without 
any explicit safeguards for the management of vested interests, 
the Declaration is bound to raise concerns. These are exacer-
bated by its treatment of commercial conflicts of interest, which 
it portrays as straightforward to manage, compared with the 
non-financial conflicts of interest of scientists: industry is too 
often perceived as suffering from fatal conflicts of interest and 
its views are therefore dismissed. In fact, commercial conflicts 
of interests are fairly easy to deal with if they are properly 
declaredIdeological, personal or academic conflicts of interest, 
on the other hand, are much harder to detect or deal with.1 This 
ignores both the vast body of evidence about the difficulties 
in managing commercial conflicts, as well as the obligation on 
academics to declare any conflicts of interest, while implying, 
without evidence, that some participants in policy debates from 
the health arena base their concerns on ideological, personal or 
academic conflicts.1
Many other statements in the Brussels Declaration seem 
entirely reasonable (see box 1). Yet there are also some that, 
especially if they are taken in isolation, such as those discussed 
here, give considerable cause for concern.
THE NEXUS OF TOBACCO AND ALCOHOL INDUSTRY 
STRATEGIES?
The content of the Declaration is reminiscent of the promotion 
of sound science and good epidemiology practice in previous 
decades, by tobacco companies such as Phillip Morris.25 In that 
instance, perfectly reasonable propositions were articulated, 
alongside the subtle inclusion of content that served key purposes 
for the company.25 For example, it was proposed that any find-
ings where the relative risk was less than two could be discounted 
because of the risk of unrecorded confounding, which conve-
niently eliminated most of the evidence on the harms of passive 
smoking. This earlier initiative was successful in achieving the 
support of key scientific organisations such as the International 
Epidemiological Association, which was unaware of the involve-
ment of Phillip Morris.25 There are also similarities with an 
approach previously used by BAT in relation to better regula-
tion; promoted to enable the inclusion of mandatory consul-
tation with all stakeholders affected by policy decision-making, 
including those otherwise excluded from policymaking.26
It is noteworthy that tobacco industry actors would not have 
been permitted to be involved overtly in discussions of tobac-
co-specific scientific or policy issues in line with Article 5.3 of 
the FCTC.4 This means that broader focused initiatives such as 
the Brussels Declaration, and the examples discussed above, may 
be strategically important to tobacco companies. The specific 
tactics used to advance tobacco industry interests in science and/
or policy warrant careful examination; for example, a National 
Dialogue on Cancer in the USA, was later shown to have been 
orchestrated by the tobacco industry.27
While we have focused so far on the tobacco industry, there 
are also seven different alcohol industry organisations named.1 
Although there are, for example, pharmaceutical actors involved 
including four from Johnson and Johnson, no other corporate 
sector matches the tobacco and alcohol industries in extent of 
involvement, perhaps because of the chosen prominence of 
addiction and public health issues. Subtle reformulations of 
key research and policy ideas are also characteristic of alcohol 
industry actors,28 though we know far less about their methods 
than we do about tobacco industry actors, due to lack of access 
to internal company documents and the underdevelopment of 
research using other data sources.
The involvement of the Brewers of Europe is, however, 
noteworthy. In 2006 that organisation convened a group of 
researchers who concluded that: violence is a subjective term 
which is fairly nebulous and elastic, which could undermine 
research on alcohol-related violence.29 In 2014 Spirits Europe, 
another alcohol industry trade association involved, criticised 
individual scientists, research projects and research agendas that 
it regarded as biased, proposing an alternative public health 
research agenda.30 The Portman Group has previously paid large 
sums to researchers who wrote anonymous critiques of a WHO 
sponsored alcohol policy evidence review.31 The Scotch Whisky 
Association led the campaign to delay the Scottish Governments 
policy on minimum unit pricing32 despite compelling evidence33 
in its favour.
Further, there are similarities with earlier alcohol industry 
approaches, notably the 1997 Dublin Principles of Cooperation 
Among the Beverage Alcohol Industry, Governments, Scientific 
Researchers, and the Public Health Community that sought 
to promote partnerships between the research community and 
industry actors.34 This initiative was sponsored by the Interna-
tional Centre for Alcohol Policies (ICAP), a body presented as 
a reliable and authoritative source of public health and policy 
guidance, but formed and funded by global alcohol producer 
companies, and in part by Phillip Morris through their ownership 
for decades of the Miller Brewing Company.35 (The successor 
organisation to ICAP, the International Alliance for Responsible 
Drinking now claims the Dublin Principles as their own.36) The 
Dublin statement drew the attention of other tobacco compa-
nies, most notably BAT. The most senior BAT figure involved 
in the Brussels Declaration said of the Dublin Principles in 2000 
in an internal company email to addressees including another 
senior figure named in the Brussels Declaration that: They 
make interesting reading. Something to aspire to?35 37 Thus, 
BAT has a long-standing interest in the Brussels Declaration 
type of initiative and, despite much rhetorical distancing from 
tobacco companies by alcohol industry actors, it is clear that they 
are willing to work closely together on influencing the science/
policy interface.38
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We identified 20 of 165 names listed in the Declaration as 
directly representing tobacco or alcohol industry organisations; 
others also have such associations. For example, a Nicoven-
tures-funded scientific paper on tobacco harm reduction was 
authored with a company employee involved in the Decla-
ration39 and another individual's companies have previously 
consulted for BAT.40
AND ON TO AFRICA
As smoking rates in traditional markets decline, low-income 
countries, including those in Africa, are seen as important 
growth areas for tobacco companies, while increasing dispos-
able incomes make these countries attractive to other global 
sectors, including alcohol. The Brussels Declaration process was 
used as the model for a further initiative convened by Sci-Com; 
in June 2017 participants from nine African countries met in 
Cape Town with some of the same thought leaders from five 
other countries to put an African-specific process on the rails.41 
This Sci-Com initiative again broadly addressed many aspects 
of the relationships between science and policy, this time in the 
context of Africa, and again recruited senior scientific figures. 
Similarly, there was a prominent focus on harm reduction for 
tobacco and alcohol, and although there was no BAT presence, 
among those involved were the Head of Communications for 
sub-Saharan Africa for Phillip Morris International, and a senior 
alcohol industry trade association representative, as well as 
political, pharmaceutical company, and governmental figures.41 
A 4-year process leading to a further declaration statement on 
ethics and principles of science and policy is intended. It seeks to 
address similar issues to those covered in the Brussels Declara-
tion in an African context.41
ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS
A range of issues are raised by the Brussels Declaration. We 
emphasise five key points. First there are questions to be 
answered by Sci-Com about the Brussels Declaration process, 
including how participants were selected, who actually attended 
the 20132015 events, how much involvement the named 
participants had in the final Declaration and how the costs were 
met. Similar questions should be asked about the African exten-
sion to this project.
Second, there are issues relating to how to protect from vested 
interests those networked forms of governance, in which consul-
tancies, and other proliferating non-traditional organisations 
such as think tanks42 are participants. In particular, the exclusion 
of tobacco companies from involvement in public health policy-
making required by Article 5.3 of the FCTC may be undermined 
by their activities in broader domains of policymaking. Tobacco 
companies are adept at subtle steering of others actions, 
including putting their own arguments in the voices of others.43 
Consequently, there is a well-founded need for monitoring of 
their activities to incorporate attention to third parties, in order 
to prevent the subversion of public health policies.21 Consid-
eration should be given to extending the governance model of 
Article 5.3 to identify those in receipt of any tobacco company 
funding for any purpose, notwithstanding the complex pathways 
through which industry funding may be channelled. Although 
there is no equivalent international treaty for alcohol, similar 
issues have been raised about the alcohol industry,44 45 partic-
ularly as its representatives are extensively involved in alcohol 
policymaking38 and there is no governance model operating to 
address these concerns. If evidence is to inform policymaking, 
there must be full transparency about funding and other conflicts 
of interest from all involved to protect against distortions of the 
evidence. Norms concerning the integrity of the process need 
to be articulated clearly, in the public interest, and there is a 
clear need to build on what has been learnt from research on the 
tobacco industry to see how it can be applied to other sectors, 
increasing knowledge about what has been termed the corporate 
determinants of health.46
Third, there is a question of how to manage potential direct 
or indirect interactions with tobacco company personnel and 
others acting on their behalf. While governmental officials 
should be cognisant of their duties to avoid tobacco company 
actors in respect of public health, vigilance is also warranted in 
relation to science and other areas of public policy. Scientists and 
policymakers accepting invitations to meetings need to under-
take due diligence about the credentials of the organisers and 
ensure that their names and reputations will not be inappropri-
ately used. It is also important that scientific and health-related 
organisations take care to avoid other ways in which their names 
and reputations can later be associated inadvertently with indus-
try-supported initiatives, such as the commercial hire of meeting 
rooms.47
Fourth, the Brussels Declaration is far from the only recent 
development in which tobacco and alcohol industry actors have 
been operating in the research community on science and policy. 
The recent announcement of a substantial investment by Phillip 
Morris International in a Foundation for a Smoke-Free World48 
has been widely criticised by leading scientists and health author-
ities, including in this journal,49 and by the WHO, which noted: 
that research and advocacy funded by tobacco companies and 
their front groups cannot be accepted at face value.50 Such activ-
ities require dedicated in-depth studies of whether the claims 
made are consistent with the activities of the actors involved,51 
and the development of new research agendas. From using 
research funding to bias the evidence base as a principal strategy 
in earlier decades, to subtle alterations to scientific norms, it now 
appears that science policy and the institutional governance of 
research have been identified by tobacco and alcohol industry 
actors as new targets for their attention in the contexts of devel-
oping global political strategies.
The final issue centres on the uses to which the Brussels Decla-
ration may be put, and more broadly, how vested interests may 
use this and other scientific issues to influence policy.52 53 It is 
premature to assess the extent to which this Declaration has been 
used successfully as an instrument of influence. We do already 
know that it has been used to gain access to key figures in policy-
making on public health, science and universities in the Brussels 
Declaration, and now the subsequent African process. We cannot 
at this stage assess whether it has influenced policymakers views 
on conflicts of interest or on the evaluation of scientific evidence, 
or whether there are any discernible impacts on public health or 
science policies. However, it does seem likely that it can be used 
in this way by vested interests. It is thus of particular concern 
that the continent of Africa, which is clearly of major strategic 
importance to the tobacco and alcohol industries,21 5456 is now 
being targeted.
CONCLUSION
The Brussels Declaration argues for the need to protect science 
from distortion by vested interests. Yet it appears to be a vehicle 
for advancing the vested interests of certain corporate sectors. 
Calls for research integrity reflect core values of the research 
community. They should not be used as instruments to under-
mine science or to assist harmful industries. It will be important 
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to study carefully to what extent this initiative, and others like 
it, do form part of the global political strategies of tobacco 
and alcohol industry actors, and the extent to which these are 
successful in influencing public health and science policies, in 
order to counter any adverse effects on population health.
What this paper adds
 Ź The Brussels Declaration claims to promote evidence-
based policy but a lack of transparency, and the extent of 
involvement of tobacco and alcohol industry actors, raise 
questions about whether it is all that it seems.
 Ź The detailed content of the Brussels Declaration contains 
material on conlicts of interest and vested interests that is 
conducive to the furtherance of corporate interests in science 
and public health policymaking.
 Ź Despite the involvement of leading scientists, government 
science advisors and other senior oficials, the Declaration 
lacks the safeguards needed to protect the integrity of 
science or policy from corporate interests, including in 
relation to the tobacco and alcohol industries.
 Ź Prominent scientists and opinion leaders need to be alert to 
ways in which they may inadvertently be used to promote 
harmful industry agendas, and there is a need for careful 
study of how, and how far, initiatives such as this inluence 
public health and science policies.
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